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The Justice and Development Party 
in Moroccan Local Politics
Miquel Pellicer and Eva Wegner
This article analyzes the performance of the Islamist Justice and Development 
Party (PJD) in Moroccan local politics from 2003 to 2009, using a variety of 
data sources including interviews, municipal budgets, and audit reports. We find 
that the PJD’s campaign and candidates were significantly different from Mo-
roccan political norms. The outcomes of audits and budget patterns show gover-
nance in towns where the PJD was elected differed only in those where the party 
had high electoral support in 2003, allowing it to govern with a small coalition.
Islamist political parties in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have been 
studied extensively since the 1990s. In the predominantly authoritarian context in which 
these parties have operated, most research has focused on Islamist ideology, and more 
recently, on electoral strategies and voters.1 With the increasing control Islamist parties 
have been gaining in local and national governments in MENA, understanding Islamist 
political practices and government performance are becoming more and more relevant.
Until recently, Islamist local governments were limited to a few cases in MENA, 
namely Turkey, the Gaza Strip, and Morocco. Therefore, there is not much evidence 
to date on Islamist government practices. A number of studies credit Islamist local 
governments in Turkey and Gaza with better delivery of services than that of their 
Miquel Pellicer and Eva Wegner are researchers at the Institute of Middle East Studies at the German 
Institute of Global and Area Studies in Hamburg. They have published extensively on political par-
ticipation, Islamist parties, and clientelism in North Africa in journals such as Quarterly Journal of 
Political Science, Party Politics, Electoral Studies, and Democratization, among others. Eva Wegner is 
also the author of Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes: The Party of Justice and Development 
in Morocco (Syracuse University Press, 2011).
This article incorporates findings that were published in 2009 as a working paper by the Robert Schuman 
Centre under the title “The Moroccan Party of Justice and Development in Local Government: Do Islamists 
Govern Differently?” The present article offers an updated and extended version of that paper and contextu-
alizes PJD governance in terms of the practices of typical Moroccan parties. The authors would like to thank 
the participants those who participated in the workshop “Spaces for Change? Decentralization, Participa-
tion, and Local Governance” at the 2009 Mediterranean Research meeting and on the panel “Islamists in 
Government” at the 2012 DAVO conference for helpful comments.
1. See, among many others, Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and 
Yemen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: 
Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Janine 
A. Clark, “Social Movement Theory and Patron-Clientelism: Islamic Social Institutions and the Middle 
Class in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 37, No. 8 (2004): pp. 941–68; 
Carlos Garcia-Rivero and Hennie Kotze, “Electoral Support for Islamic Parties in the Middle East and 
North Africa,” Party Politics, Vol. 13, No. 5 (Sep. 2007), pp. 611–36; Miquel Pellicer and Eva Wegner, 
“Socio-Economic Voter Profile and Motives for Islamist Support in Morocco,” Party Politics, Vol. 20, 
No. 1 (Jan. 2014), pp. 116–33; Michael D.H. Robbins, “What Accounts for the Success of Islamist Par-
ties in the Arab World?” Dubai Initiative Policy Brief (Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School, Novem-
ber 2009), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Robbins_-_Policy_Brief_-_FINAL.pdf.
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predecessors.2 At the same time, studies also have found that that corruption persisted 
in Islamist-led municipalities in Turkey, and that better service delivery came at high 
costs and increased debt.3 An aggressive stance on moral issues was softened, or at 
least mitigated over time.4
This article aims to contribute to the literature on Islamist political practices 
and government performance by studying the first cycle of local governments of 
the Moroccan Islamist Justice and Development Party (Hizb al-‘Adala wa-l-Tanmi-
ya, known by the acronym of its French name, PJD for Parti de la Justice et du 
Développement) from 2003 to 2009. The question that this article aims to answer 
is whether the PJD’s behavior in local politics was different from standard Moroc-
can parties, and if so, in what ways. While there are important differences between 
Moroccan political parties, the literature documents a convergence on a number of 
party practices that we define as standard: a disregard of party organization for politi-
cal decision-making and electoral mobilization, the absence of ideology and policy 
considerations for coalition-building, a lack of effort of individual politicians, a high 
tolerance toward corrupt practices, and a shared — notable-type — profile of elected 
officials. These characteristics act as the point of comparison when assessing the 
PJD’s behavior in local politics in this article.
We combine a variety of sources and types of data to address the topic, including 
interviews with Moroccan party representatives, observation of electoral campaigns, 
electoral and census data, as well as audit reports from Morocco’s auditors’ courts. 
Additionally, we cite interviews with PJD mayors, as well as budget data for three PJD-
governed municipalities.
Our analysis reveals that the PJD showed a different approach to local politics 
governance in the stages before it had to face the realities of governing, shown for 
example in the importance it placed in campaign organization and the type of candi-
dates it ran. For the PJD’s performance in governance, the evidence is mixed based on 
government outcomes. We only find a difference between towns where the party won 
a significant share — above 30% — of local council seats. Only in the these towns did 
the PJD government appear to have effected changes, with the data showing indications 
of increased investment and decreased corruption, resulting in impressive gains for 
the PJD in the following elections. We believe that this may be due to the PJD having 
2. Yezid Sayigh, “Hamas Rule in Gaza: Three Years On” Middle East Brief, No. 41 (Crown 
Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, March 2010), www.brandeis.edu/crown/pub-
lications/meb/MEB41.pdf; Jenny B. White, “Pragmatists or Ideologues? Turkey’s Welfare Party in 
Power,” Current History (Jan. 1997), pp. 25–30; Nathan J. Brown, “Gaza Five Years On: Hamas 
Settles In,” The Carnegie Papers (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace June 2012), http://
carnegieendowment.org/files/hamas_settles_in.pdf; Élise Massicard, “L’Islamisme Turc à L’Épreuve 
du Pouvoir Municipal: Production d’Espaces, Pratiques du Gouvernement et Gestion des Sociétés 
Locales” [“Turkish Islamism and the Test of Municipal Power: Production of Space, Government 
Practice, and Local Society Management”], Critique Internationale, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Feb. 2009), pp. 
21–38; Ugur Akinci, “The Welfare Party’s Municipal Track Record: Evaluating Islamist Municipal 
Activism in Turkey,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Winter 1999), pp. 75–94.
3. Akinci, “The Welfare Party’s Municipal Track Record;” Massicard, “Turkish Islamism and the 
Test of Municipal Power.”
4. Brown, “Gaza Five Years On;” Sayigh, “Hamas Rule in Gaza;” White, “Pragmatists or Ideo-
logues?;” Massicard, “Turkish Islamism and the Test of Municipal Power.”
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greater room to maneuver in these municipalities to implement its agenda compared to 
towns in which the party had less support and was forced to govern with an average of 
five coalition partners.
The first section of this article gives a background on Moroccan politics at the 
national and local levels, and the normative behavior of its political parties. The sec-
ond section analyzes the PJD’s political operations at the local level, including its 
campaign in the 2003 elections and its coalition-forming practices. The third section 
studies government outcomes in terms of corruption and spending in areas where the 
PJD participated in and led local councils. The fourth section looks at the relationship 
between the PJD’s performance and the results of the 2009 local elections, and the 
final section concludes.
POLITICS AND PARTY PRACTICES IN MOROCCO
The Moroccan monarchy is an electoral, but authoritarian regime. Democratic 
institutions play a role in policy-making, but policies against the core interests of the 
palace are impossible to enact. Political liberalization measures that included con-
stitutional reforms in the 1990s — and more recently in 2011 — have continuously 
increased the scope for elected representatives’ influence, although they have never 
touched on the core of monarchical power.5 Multiparty elections have been held since 
the country’s independence from France in 1956. Up until the late 1990s, blatant elec-
toral fraud ensured the dominance of pro-palace parties. Since King Muhammad VI’s 
accession to the throne in 1999, elections have become much more transparent. At the 
same time, redistricting has occurred before every single election in the 2000s; vote-
buying and more traditional clientelist practices also remain widespread.
LocaL Government
The political reforms of the late 1990s and early 2000s also increased decen-
tralization. Since the mid-1970s, municipal councils have held some prerogatives and 
some degree of budget control with the goal of using them as sources of patronage and 
co-optation for the regime.6 A new municipal charter introduced in 2002 increased the 
prerogatives of local councils with respect to governors, who are appointed by the king, 
and municipal councillors were also granted indemnities and other office-related ben-
efits. Local budgets in most municipalities are largely self-managed, and the councils 
can collect taxes, and can locally organize the provision of public services.
With respect to policy-making, local councils suffer from the same restric-
tions as national governments. Although many local council decisions are certain-
ly less sensitive than those of national governments, their actions are in practice 
5. For more information on the political liberalization process in the 1990s, see Lise Storm, De-
mocratization in Morocco: The Political Elite and Struggles for Power in the Post-Independence 
State (New York: Routledge, 2007). For a critical analysis of the 2011 constitutional reforms, see 
Ahmed Benchemsi, “Morocco: Outfoxing the Opposition,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 23, No. 1 
(Jan. 2012), pp. 57–69.
6. Abdeslam M. Maghraoui, “Depoliticization in Morocco,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 
4 (Oct. 2002): pp. 24–32. Municipal councils existed since 1960, but had a consultative role at best. 
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closely monitored by regime representatives (such as pashas in municipalities, gov-
ernors in regions, and walis in provinces) on the ground. In practice, the budgets 
of urban municipalities also have to be approved by the interior ministry before 
they can be implemented.7 Moreover, the competences and powers of municipal 
councils remain relatively general and ambiguous. The relationship between the 
councils’ competences and those of other national agencies and ministries remains 
especially vague, thus leaving a considerable margin for the regime to intervene in 
local government decisions.
PoLiticaL Parties
While a multiparty system was already provided for in Morocco’s first constitu-
tion in 1962, the recognition of the monarchy’s political and religious legitimacy is a 
prerequisite for any party to gain and maintain legal status. However, we can divide 
political parties in Morocco into two types: those that are palace creations and those 
with a legacy of loyal opposition.8 The first type consists of parties created by the pal-
ace and those that were officially founded by public figures close to the regime. Their 
most important function is to organize parliamentary support for the king’s political 
initiatives. Before the political reforms of the 1990s, these parties were, in differ-
ent configurations, in government. Key parties in this group are the Popular Move-
ment (al-Haraka al-Sha‘biyya, or Mouvement Populaire), founded in 1958 by Mo-
hand Laenser to organize support of rural notables for the regime, the National Rally 
of Independents (al-Tajammu‘ al-Watani li-l-Ahrar, or Rassemblement National des 
Indépendants, i.e., RNI); founded in 1977 by Ahmed ‘Osman, a brother-in-law of 
King Hasan II; and the Constitutional Union (al-Ittihad al-Dusturi, or Union Consti-
tutionelle), an offshoot of the RNI that formed in 1983. Since 2007, the Authenticity 
and Modernity Party (Hizb al-Asala wa-l-Hadatha or Parti Authenticité et Modernité) 
has been a powerful addition to this group. It was founded by Fouad ‘Ali El Himma, 
known in Morocco as l’ami du roi (the friend of the king).9
The second type of political party emerged from opposition movements and 
had aspirations for radical political change at some point in their history. Long-
established important parties in this group are Istiqlal (in full: Hizb al-Istiqlal, the 
7. Anja Hoffman, “Decentralization and Re-Centralization in Morocco: A View from the Middle 
Atlas,” CERAM Working Paper 2013, No. 1 (2013).
8. For details on Moroccan parties, see Anouar Boukhars, Politics in Morocco: Executive Mon-
archy and Enlightened Authoritarianism (New York: Routledge, 2010); Jean-Claude Santucci,  Les 
Partis Politiques Marocains à l’Épreuve du Pouvoir: Analyse Diachronique et Socio-Politique d’un 
Pluralisme Sous Contrôle [Moroccan Political Parties and the Test of Power: A Historic and Sociopo-
litical Analysis of Pluralism Under Supervision] (Rabat: Revue Morocaine d’Administration Locale 
et de Développement, 2001); Michael J. Willis, “Political Parties in the Maghrib: The Illusion of 
Significance?” The Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 1–22; Michael 
J. Willis, “Political Parties in the Maghrib: Ideology and Identification. A Suggested Typology,” The 
Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Autumn 2002), pp. 1–28.
9. James Liddell, “Notables, Clientelism and the Politics of Change in Morocco,” The Journal 
of North African Studies Vol. 15, No. 3 (Sept. 2010), pp. 315–31; Ferdinand Eibl, “The Party of Au-
thenticity and Modernity (PAM): Trajectory of a Political Deus ex Machina,” The Journal of North 
African Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Jan. 2012), pp. 45–66.
36 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
Independence Party), and, to its left, the offshoot Socialist Union of Popular Forces 
(al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki li-l-Quwwat al-Sha‘biyya or Union Socialiste des Forces 
Populaires, i.e., USFP). Although both parties abandoned their revolutionary aspira-
tions in the 1970s, they have continued to call for democratic reforms to some ex-
tent. Since their co-optation by the national government in the late 1990s, both par-
ties’ calls for reforms have been dampened and clientelistic practices have become 
more common.10 For the more policy-oriented USFP, this has come at the price of a 
dramatic electoral decline.11
The third party in this group is the Islamist Justice and Development Party 
(PJD).12 Once the most active opposition party, it was brought into the government 
after winning the largest seat share in post–Arab Spring elections in 2011. The 
PJD emerged in the 1990s as one of two key Moroccan Islamist organizations and 
first participated in elections in 1997. Since then, the party has evolved into a very 
moderate party where an identity- or Islam-inspired political agenda (such as the 
protest against the reform of the personal status law) has been increasingly com-
bined with a more socioeconomic agenda (trying to lower unemployment and re-
form administration). The PJD still mobilizes against the sale and advertisement of 
alcohol, and movies or cultural festivals it considers un-Islamic, but a large amount 
of its morality-based interventions have in effect been targeted at corruption.13 In-
deed, it has come to identify itself as a party with an “Islamic frame of reference” 
and a “genuine economic and social program.”14
Although the PJD has increased its electoral support overall, its short history 
features considerable ups and downs. So far, the most critical moment of the party’s 
history coincided with its entry into local politics in 2003. In that year, Islamist ter-
rorist attacks in Casablanca created a political climate in which a party ban was not 
unthinkable. Under this threat, the PJD made a number of ideological and political 
concessions that led to its later rehabilitation. Following a 2007 electoral perfor-
mance far below its expectations, the party changed its leadership in 2008 from the 
technocrat Saâdeddine El-‘Othmani to the more old-style Islamist leader ‘Abdelilah 
Benkirane. The period under study in this article therefore begins with a defensive 
PJD in 2003 and ends with a more populist PJD in 2009.
10. The USFP left national government in 2011, Istiqlal remained in a coalition that includes the PJD.
11. Eva Wegner and Miquel Pellicer, “Left-Islamist Opposition Cooperation in Morocco,” British 
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Dec. 2011), pp. 303–22.
12. For a study of the PJD’s history, political agenda, and party organization, see Eva Wegner, Is-
lamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes: The Moroccan Party of Justice and Development (Syra-
cuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011).
13. Matt Buehler, “The Threat to ‘Un-Moderate’: Moroccan Islamists and the Arab Spring,” Mid-
dle East Law and Governance, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2013), pp. 23–24; Eva Wegner, “Islamist Inclusion and 
Regime Persistence: The Moroccan Win-Win Situation,” in Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dy-
namics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes, ed. Oliver Schlumberger (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2007), pp. 75–90.
14. See Matt Buehler, “Safety-Valve Elections and the Arab Spring: The Weakening (and Re-
surgence) of Morocco’s Islamist Opposition Party,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 25, No. 1 
(2013), pp. 142–43.
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tyPicaL Party Practices in morocco
There is a growing literature on the challenges and shortcomings of Moroccan 
political parties.15 While important differences exist between Moroccan political par-
ties, many of their practices have converged over the last decades. Most parties practice 
what Anouar Boukhars describes pointedly as “politics without positions.”16 In the fol-
lowing, we will focus on some core common characteristics of Moroccan political par-
ties. These “standard practices” will then serve as a benchmark against which we will 
evaluate the PJD’s practices in local politics.
A first shared feature is the irrelevance of party organizations. There is a low 
consideration for party committees in making key decisions — such as making coali-
tion alliances or remaining in government or not — or in selecting candidates or party 
leaders. At worst, key decisions and leadership selections are made by a small group 
and candidates for legislative office, who often pay for good placement on electoral 
lists.17 Along the same lines, parties have neglected grassroots activities and building 
constituencies.18 This also implies that parties lack activists willing to work in election 
campaigns. In fact, most parties are forced to pay for canvassing.19
A second standard practice is the absence of policy or ideological considerations 
when building either national or local government coalitions. Instead, coalition build-
ing follows “strict opportunistic considerations,”20 the overriding objective of which is 
to join a government. As a result, a typical Moroccan coalition consists of four or more 
parties, and frequently includes both palace and non-palace parties, as well as both 
secular and religious parties.
Third, many parties suffer from the lack of effort of individual politicians. This 
is shown, for example, in a high rate of absenteeism in parliament and the general 
unpreparedness of politicians when questioning or voting on draft laws.21 This lack of 
15. Boukhars, Politics in Morocco; Myriam Catusse, “Affaires, Scandales et Urnes de Verre à 
Casablanca: Les Ambiguïtés de la ‘Démocratie Locale’ à l’Ère de la ‘Bonne Gouvernance’” [“Af-
fairs, Scandals, and Glass Ballots in Casablanca: The Ambiguities of ‘Local Democracy’ and the Era 
of ‘Good Governance’”], EUI Working Papers: Mediterranean Programme Series, No. 38 (European 
University Institute, 2002), http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/1796/02_38.pdf; Mohamed 
Daadaoui, “Rituals of Power and Political Parties in Morocco: Limited Elections as Positional Strate-
gies,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Mar. 2010), pp. 195–219; Marina Ottaway and Amr 
Hamzawy, “Fighting on Two Fronts: Secular Parties in the Arab World,” Carnegie Papers No. 85 
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2007), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cp85_
secular_final.pdf; Santucci, Moroccan Political Parties and the Test of Power; Lise Storm, Party Poli-
tics and the Prospects for Democracy in North Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013); Willis, 
“Political Parties in the Maghrib: The Illusion of Significance?” 
16. Boukhars, Politics in Morocco, pp. 61–83.
17. Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi, “Mobilisations Électorales à Derb Soltan et à Hay Hassani (Casa-
blanca)” [“Electoral Mobilization in Darb Sultan and the Hay Hassani (Casablanca)”], in Scènes et 
Coulisses de l’Élection au Maroc: Les Législatives 2002 [Behind the Scenes in the Election in Moroc-
co: The 2002 Legislative] (Aix-en-Provence: Institut de Recherches et d‘Études sur le Monde Arabe 
et Musulman, 2004), pp. 105–62; Daadaoui, “Rituals of Power and Political Parties in Morocco.”
18. Ottaway and Hamzawy, “Fighting on Two Fronts,” p. 207.
19. Bennani-Chraïbi, “Electoral Mobilization in Darb Sultan and the Hay Hassani.”
20. Boukhars, Politics in Morocco, p. 64.
21. Boukhars, Politics in Morocco.
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effort was a key target of the PJD’s parliamentary activities from 1997 to 2002, when it 
sought to establish itself as a party of hard-working and committed politicians.22
 A fourth shared characteristic is widespread corrupt practices of candidates or 
elected officials, which can take various forms. In elections, there is a high tolerance 
for vote-buying. At the local level, reports of Morocco’s Court of Auditors (al-Majlis 
al-A‘la li-l-Hisabat or Cour des Comptes, i.e., CdC) document a high amount of irregu-
larities in public tenders, construction permits, and tax collection, as well as the mis-
use of municipal resources.23 Through various forms of corruption, municipal councils 
have become “sources of immense wealth.”24
A final shared characteristic of Moroccan parties is the demographic profile 
of individuals they bring into public office. Based on data published by the Moroc-
can interior ministry, the typical local councillor is male, relatively uneducated, and 
middle-aged, and works as a “peasant” (“fellah”) — implying that he is likely to be 
a rural notable.
In the following sections, we will evaluate the PJD’s local government experience 
from 2003 to 2009 in light of these five “standard party practices.” A core message of 
the PJD has been a promise to be “different” than the typical Moroccan party, implying 
that it would not reproduce these practices. The question we seek to answer, however, 
is whether this promise of difference holds once the party entered local politics and 
local government. Hence, we will assess the role of the PJD’s party organization in 
campaigning and decision-making, the importance of party ideology when forming lo-
cal government coalitions, the profile of its elected representatives, the effort made by 
its local politicians, and the party’s tolerance toward corrupt practices.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SETUP
eLectoraL PreParations
The PJD’s 2003 election campaign displays two noteworthy characteristics when 
compared to the standard practices described above: the importance of the party’s organiza-
tion and the distinctive profile of PJD candidates in contrast to the typical Moroccan party.
The prominent role of the party’s organization, manifest in all aspects of the PJD 
campaign, is the most striking feature of the PJD relative to other Moroccan parties. 
Months before the election — very early by Moroccan standards — PJD leaders in 
collaboration with local party activists released a full campaign strategy, consisting of 
a party platform, a video advertisement, and standardized slides for candidates’ pre-
sentations.25 The party’s promises in local elections can be summarized as a higher 
level of “proximity” to the voters (being responsive to their demands), to “moralize 
the management of public affairs” (less corruption), and to provide improved access to 
government services.
22. Wegner, “Islamist Inclusion and Regime Persistence.”
23. Yearly reports are available at on the CdC’s official website, www.courdescomptes.ma.
24. Maghraoui, “Depoliticization in Morocco.” See also, Catusse, “Affairs, Scandals, and Glass 
Ballots in Casablanca.”
25. Interview by Eva Wegner with the PJD’s 2003 local election campaign coordinator, September 
4, 2003, Rabat.
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Ahead of the elections, local party bureaus received funding from the central 
office for their campaign meetings.26 Local party chapters made considerable cam-
paign drives, which not only included the production of local campaign materials, 
such as adding a video focusing on local problems, but also organizing rallies and 
campaign meetings in which they presented the candidates and the party platform. In 
these meetings, operatives put lots of emphasis on the qualifications and skills of PJD 
candidates.27 In the Moroccan context, it is important to highlight that local PJD activ-
ists and supporters mobilized their election campaign, rather than a centralized party 
leadership. Finally, local party members drew up candidate lists, although there was 
some important intervention from the party’s central office.28 In short, the PJD’s local 
electoral campaign was a party effort rather than an individual effort by a party leader, 
as is the case for most Moroccan parties.
A second distinctive feature was the profile of the PJD’s electoral candidates. Table 
I displays the profiles of PJD elected councillors in terms of education, age, and pro-
fession, in comparison to the averages for councillors across all Moroccan parties. To 
determine whether the PJD’s councillor profiles are mainly a product of the party’s deep-
rootedness in urban areas, the figure also shows the profiles of USFP councillors, which 
is the other party with the strongest urban roots among the major Moroccan parties.
As shown in Table I, the PJD fielded candidates in these elections with a substantially 
higher level of education than candidates from the average Moroccan party. 61% of its can-
didates were university-educated compared to only 23% of candidates generally. PJD can-
didates were also considerably younger than those of other parties: 75% of PJD councillors 
were under 45 years old compared to around 40% on average. Finally, the most common 
profession among PJD candidates was teaching (either in schools or at university), where-
as the average candidate tended to be a “fellah” (most likely a local notable). In respect 
to these demographic characteristics, the USFP councillors closely resemble the average 
councillor. The PJD thus fielded candidates with a significantly different demographic pro-
file than the average, as well as its main competitor in urban constituencies, the USFP. 29
26. In principle, the USFP also contributed funds to local campaigns. However, USFP members 
in Larache and Ksar El Kébir reported that funds and other election materials never arrived on time. 
Interviews by the authors with USFP members, November 25, 2008, Ksar El Kébir and Larache). 
It is also quite common that candidates in other parties finance their own campaign. See Catusse, 
“Affairs, Scandals, and Glass Ballots in Casablanca;” Lamia Zaki, “Le Clientélisme: Vecteur de 
Politisation en Régime Autoritaire?” [“Clientelism: A Vector of Politicization in an Authoritarian 
Regime?”] in Autoritarismes Démocratiques: Démocraties Autoritaires au XXIe Siècle [Democra-
tic Authoritarianisms: Authoritarian Democracies in the 21st Century] Recherches No. 1 (2007), pp. 
157–80; Bennani-Chraïbi, “Electoral Mobilization in Darb Sultan and the Hay Hassani.”
27. These conclusions are based on observations of local campaigns and interviews in Salé, the 
Ya‘qub al-Mansur neighborhood in Rabat, the Hay Hassani neighborhood in Casablanca, Meknès, 
Larache, and Ksar El Kébir in 2003 and 2009.
28. These interventions mainly consisted of attempts to secure the election of technocrats or other 
individuals thought to be able to deliver on the PJD’s electoral promise of better management. See 
Wegner, “Islamist Inclusion and Regime Persistence.”
29. The 2009 electoral campaign confirmed that the 2003 campaign was not an anomaly. The role 
of local and central party organizations in preparing and carrying out the campaign remained impor-
tant. The profile of PJD candidates remained significantly different in terms of age, education, and 
profession from the average candidate profile. The 2009 campaign also suggests that an emphasis on 
pragmatism over Islamism is a long-term feature of the PJD’s local political strategy.
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Table I. Demographic Profile of Moroccan Municipal Councillors, 2003–9
Level of Education
Party Primary or Less Secondary University
PJD 11% 28% 61%
USFP 44% 30% 25%
all parties 46% 31% 23%
Age Cohort
Party Under 45 45–54 55 and Over
PJD 74% 21% 4%
USFP 47% 36% 17%
all parties 44% 35% 22%
Profession
Party “Fellah” Teacher Other
PJD 6% 38% 56%
USFP 27% 18% 55%
all parties 31% 10% 58%
Source: Kingdom of Morocco, Ministry of the Interior, General Directorate of Local Communities, 
Les Collectivités Locales en Chiffres [Local Communities in Statistics] (Rabat: Ministère 
de l’Intérieur, 2009).
coaLition-BuiLdinG
Although the PJD had developed new campaigning strategies and processes of 
candidate selection, coalition-building was the party’s first encounter with the reali-
ties of Moroccan partisan politics. And indeed, the PJD’s goal to govern led it to adopt 
practices and criteria for the formation of coalitions that were not that different from 
established practices. In essence, ideology and policy mattered very little.
In 2003, the PJD did not win an absolute majority in any town, but won sizeable 
shares of seats in a few. In most towns where the PJD fielded candidates, support was less 
than ten percent.30 This was partly due to the PJD’s precarious situation after the suicide 
bombings in Casablanca on May 16. Following pressure from the interior ministry, the 
party leadership made the far-reaching decision to contest significantly fewer seats than 
they had planned before the attacks. Additionally, the PJD only fielded partial candidate 
lists in the larger cities to ensure that it could not win a majority in such places.31 These 
two measures obviously decreased the potential scope of PJD-led local government.
Within the constraints of relatively low levels of success and high levels of 
party system fragmentation, the PJD’s goal in 2003 was to bring as many party 
mayors into office as possible. This goal could afford little to no consideration for 
30. The PJD won less than ten percent of seats in 136 municipalities, between ten and 30% in 62 
municipalities, and above 30% in only 13 municipalities.
31. Wegner, “Islamist Inclusion and Regime Persistence.”
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differences in political agendas, as demonstrated in the coalition-formation criteria 
provided by the national party leadership.
The PJD’s national party leadership stipulated that coalition-building should take 
into account the integrity and competence of other councillors, and how the respective 
parties had performed so far in local management.32 Noticeably, the policies promoted 
by other parties were not among the criteria on which local alliances were to be built.33
Indeed, PJD mayors admitted in interviews that policies played no role in the 
coalition-building process and that there was no coalition contract or action plan.34 
Generally, PJD mayors, as well as members of their governing coalitions, confirmed 
that the formation of the municipal governments had followed the standard pattern in 
Morocco, in which the bargaining almost exclusively concerns the distribution of re-
munerated offices (who will be mayor, deputy mayor, and so on).
Interviews suggest that in practice, the main criterion in forming a coalition was 
whether it was possible to do so with people that were not completely delegitimized by pre-
vious municipal (mis)management. The PJD’s tolerance of who fit into that category seems 
to have been rather large. When explaining their coalitions, PJD councillors argued that 
“nobody was 100% honest,” nor was anyone “100% bad.”35 Sometimes, though, council-
lors had to metaphorically “close their eyes vis-à-vis some councillors or parties”36 because 
they were so objectionable. As a result, the PJD often found itself in “tough” coalitions, not 
from an ideological perspective, but from a personal point of view, as the party coalesced, 
in the words of one of its councillors, with “all sorts of people, illiterate, corrupted.”37
This evidence suggests that the PJD’s approach to the makeup of local govern-
ments in 2003 was strikingly similar to standard practice in Morocco. At the same time, 
it is noteworthy that this disregard of policies in coalition-building was largely a party 
approach. In the context of the May 16 attacks, the party’s explicit strategy had been to 
show potential voters through a moderate, accommodating governing approach that it 
was not to be feared. With only limited representation in certain districts and without 
any majorities, PJD mayors would have been even rarer had the party been more selec-
tive in its choice of coalition partners. The PJD’s 2003 approach to local coalitions was 
thus driven by strategic considerations and did not imply an institutional socialization 
of its local politicians against the party’s will.38
32. Interview by Eva Wegner with a PJD leader, November 17, 2003, location withheld on request.
33. Sometimes, there were political reasons why the PJD did not govern towns in which it had 
won the largest seat share, such as in Larache. Closely located to Ksar El Kébir, it was, in 2003 not 
acceptable for the PJD to govern both. Interview by the authors with Larache councillors from the 
USFP and the PSU, November 25, 2008, Larache).
34. In Témara, the governing coalition did draw up a small charter but this document was a “dec-
laration of honor” and did not address content. In other cases, there was no document of any type. 
Interview by the authors with town mayors, November 15, 2008, Témara; November 27, 2008, Oued 
Zem; and November 14, 2008, Ksar El Kébir.
35. Interview by Eva Wegner with a PJD deputy mayor, November 12, 2003, location withheld.
36. Interview by Eva Wegner with a PJD deputy mayor, December 6, 2003, location withheld.
37. Interview by Eva Wegner with a PJD deputy mayor, April 12, 2004, location withheld.
38. In 2009, the PJD won absolute majorities in 14 towns and was thus less desperate to form 
government coalitions. The party generally attempted to form “programmatic” coalitions with the 
USFP, the only other party it perceived to have an interest in effective local government and in 
promoting democratic reforms (see Wegner and Pellicer, “Left-Islamist Opposition Cooperation in 
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PJD LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Of the 1,503 municipalities in 2003, the PJD only managed to establish 12 gov-
ernments, all with coalitions.39 Table II shows some socioeconomic characteristics of 
these towns compared to the averages of Moroccan municipalities and urban munici-
palities specifically. Table III then displays the level of PJD support and the number of 
partners it needed to establish a coalition.
Table II shows that the PJD essentially governed in urban areas (nine out of 12 
locations). These are typical Moroccan cities in terms of literacy and poverty rates, 
although they are slightly lower than average. However, they have a lower share of 
inhabitants living in slums than the average urban municipality, the exception being 
Témara, which has 30% of its inhabitants living in slums.
Table II. Profiles of PJD-Governed Locales vs. Moroccan Average, 2003–9
Locale Area Poverty Rate (%)
Illiteracy Rate 
(%)
Portion of 
Population in 
Slums (%)
El Guerdane urban 5 37 2
Ksar El Kébir urban 9.2 32 3.6
Oued Zem urban 10.6 35 8.5
Ouislane urban 13.6 35 7.6
Témara urban 8.5 27 30.7
Meknès urban 7.2 27 4.2
Azrou urban 9.4 31 6.3
Kasba Tadla urban 7.9 33 6.4
Khénifra urban 11 35 6
average (PJD areas) urban 9 32 8
average (nationwide) urban 11 34 8
Tabia rural 27 68 0
Issen rural 20.9 57 0.7
Had Boumoussa rural 10 59 4
average (PJD areas) all 12 40 7
average (nationwide) all 22 57 5
Source: Kingdom of Morocco, High Commission of Planning, “Recensement Général de la Population 
et de l’Habitat 2004” [“General Census of Population and Housing, 2004”], www.hcp.ma/
Recensement-general-de-la-population-et-de-l-habitat-2004_a633.html.
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Morocco.”). Therefore, the national PJD’s general policy on local coalitions was again implemented 
on the ground, albeit differently than in 2003.
39. This excludes four district councils led by the PJD in Rabat, Salé, Fez, and Casablanca.
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Table III divides PJD-governed towns into three groups according to the seat share 
the party commanded in each of these councils: a first group with more than 30%, a sec-
ond group from 10% to 30%, and a third group below 10%. Broadly speaking, the lower 
the seat share, the more coalition partners the PJD had. On one hand, this is natural 
because the smaller its own share, the larger the gap to reach the majority in a council. 
On the other hand, the difference is quite dramatic, jumping from as low as one coalition 
partner in the first group to as many as eight in the second. As we will discuss below, 
these different groups of localities have taken different paths under PJD-led governance.
Table III: PJD-Governed Locales and Coalition Partnerships
Locale PJD Seat Share (%) Parties in Coalition  (alongside the PJD)
El Guerdane 45.5 1
Ksar El Kébir 40.0 1
Oued Zem 32.3 4
Issen 30.8 1
Témara 25.7 8
Meknès 25.5 6
Azrou 20.0 5
Kasba Tadla 13.8 3
Khénifra 12.9 at least 4
Ouislane 12.0 5
Had Boumassa 8.0 n/a
Tabia 7.7 n/a
Sources: Interviews by the authors with PJD officials and local press reports
We will now assess two core aspects of PJD-led local governments relative to 
standard practice. The first is the level of corruption and mismanagement based on 
audit reports, the second looks at efforts made by the PJD’s local politicians in invest-
ment and tax collection. Our discussion of corruption and mismanagement is based on 
audits of five PJD-governed towns (Ksar El Kébir, Témara, Meknès, Azrou, and Kasba 
Tadla) by the CdC, while our discussion of the PJD’s performance in local government 
is based on the evolution of budgets in three municipalities governed by the party (Ksar 
El Kébir, Témara, and Oued Zem).
corruPtion and mismanaGement
Empirically, corruption is difficult to assess. The assessment is perhaps more dif-
ficult in a country such as Morocco, where corruption is generally high, but is typically 
only prosecuted for political motives. Consequently, we rely on yearly reports of Mo-
rocco’s regional auditor courts (CdCs) that provide detailed accounts of their jurisdic-
tions. The local CdCs do more than verify the accounts of a municipality, they investi-
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gate public tenders, construction and other public projects, tax receipts, expenses, and 
other public finances. The regional CdCs that are responsible for auditing the munici-
palities were set up in 2004. From then until 2009, regional CdCs undertook control 
missions in 86% of urban municipalities (144 out of 212) and in 7% of rural towns (86 
out of 1,305).40  The recurrent observations highlighted by CdCs stated that there was 
no respect of the procedures for public tenders, issues relating to construction, lack of 
collection of a variety of taxes or fees, and waste of municipal resources.41 While the 
evidence from these reports does not allow us to quantify the level of corruption and 
mismanagement in PJD-governed towns relative to the average, the reports allow for 
a comparison between stated PJD practices and these recurrent issues noted by CdCs.
The CdC reports are sober in style, giving detailed accounts of irregularities in pub-
lic expenditure and public administration. Detailed responses of the audited towns’ mayors 
to the issues raised by CdCs are also included in the reports. We are thus quite confident 
about the quality and neutrality of the assessments themselves. Since 2007, the reports 
have not published the full list of audited towns, but instead the audit details a selec-
tion of towns that get “recommendations,” meaning where problems were identified. It is 
therefore possible that further towns were audited but not included in the reports. Because 
political pressure against the inclusion of a badly managed town would certainly not help 
the PJD, we are confident that we have the full list of recommendations for PJD towns. In 
contrast, it is possible that more PJD towns were audited and received a clean audit.
Of all audited PJD towns that we know of, only Ksar El Kébir did not get “recommen-
dations” from the regional CdC, suggesting that the amount of irregularities was negligible in 
this municipality. Audited PJD-governed towns that did get recommendations are Meknès, 
Témara, Azrou, and Kasba Tadla. An overview of irregularities in these towns is shown in 
Table IV below, organized by the recurrent problems noted above, including issues relating 
to the granting of construction permits, tax collection, and waste of municipal resources.
Table IV. Level of Irregularities in CDC Audits in PJD-Governed Towns
Locale Year of Audit Construction 
Permits
Tax Collection Municipal 
Waste
Ksar El Kébir 2005 n/a n/a n/a
Témara 2007 high low high
Meknès 2006 — high high
Azrou 2006 low high low
Kasba Tadla 2009 low high high
Source: Annual reports of the Court of Auditors between 2005 and 2011, see Kingdom of Morocco, 
Court of Auditors,  “Publications,” www.courdescomptes.ma/fr/Page-27/publications.
40. Kingdom of Morocco, Court of Auditors, Rapport Annuel de la Cour des Comptes 2010: Par-
tie II  — Activités des Cours Régionales des Comptes [Court of Auditors Annual Report 2010: Part 
II — Activities of the Regional Courts of Auditors] (Rabat, 2011), www.courdescomptes.ma/upload/
MoDUle_20/File_20_53.pdf, p. 681.
41. Kingdom of Morocco, Court of Auditors, Rapport Annuel de la Court des Comptes 2008: 
Tome 2 [Court of Auditors Annual Report 2008: Book 2] (Rabat, 2009), www.courdescomptes.ma/
upload/MoDUle_20/File_20_49.pdf, p. 71–79.
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The first important observation is that CdCs did not find problems relating to pub-
lic tenders in PJD-governed towns.42 In contrast, there were irregularities in all other 
categories, but to different extents, and with generally a low level of issues relating to 
construction permits but a high level of issues regarding tax collection and the waste of 
municipal resources. Whereas all of these actions may reflect corrupt practices, a care-
ful reading of the reports suggests that this is less likely in the areas of tax collection 
and municipal resources than in the area of construction permits.
Regarding tax collection, the observations by CdCs do not concern new tax ex-
emptions, but the continuation of old practices. This suggests the unwillingness or in-
ability of PJD governments to determine the tax base accurately and to enforce tax 
collection, rather than corrupt practices.
The waste of municipal resources ranges from the renting out of municipal 
property at absurdly low rates (one building for 13 Moroccan dirhams, i.e., MAD, or 
roughly $1.50 per month in Azrou), to the use of municipal resources (space, cars, 
furniture, etc.) by people not entitled to them, to the payment of fees such as phone 
bills, gasoline, and rents for all sorts of ineligible public servants, and the payment 
of public servants that are in fact not working for the municipality but for the execu-
tive branch (i.e., the local representatives of the interior ministry such as pashas and 
caïds, including 126 public servants in Témara alone). Again, these issues appear to 
be a continuation of practices that existed prior to the PJD’s entry into office. CdCs, 
whenever possible, explicitly date the beginning of certain practices or contracts. 
And indeed, many of these predate the PJD-led governments. In this sense, the con-
tinuation of such routines again suggests not so much corrupt dealings by the PJD 
itself, but its inability to dramatically change entrenched arrangements, especially 
when these benefit the regime.43
The existence of corruption is less clear regarding construction permits or their ex 
post facto approval, as these were newly provided by PJD-led executives. In Témara, 
the key issues raised by CdCs were additional levels for all buildings that were previ-
ously limited to two and three floors, additional levels for a number of other buildings, 
and construction permits for areas that were ineligible for construction. It is not clear 
whether this involved corrupt practices by the PJD — or anyone else for that matter — 
but it certainly could have.
In sum, we found that the town audits reveal a number of insights. First, only one 
town received a clean audit, signaling that the arrival of the PJD in town halls did not 
lead to a revolution of transparency and legal practices. Second, the scale of irregu-
larities in PJD towns was not that large.44 Importantly, the irregularities do not involve 
42. There was a small problem in Meknès where the terms of a public tender were modified 
later on so that in hindsight, the municipality had not chosen the cheapest company. See Kingdom 
of Morocco, Court of Auditors, Rapport Annuel 2007 [Annual Report 2007] (Rabat, 2008), www.
courdescomptes.ma/upload/MoDUle_20/File_20_47.pdf, p. 509.
43. In fact, the mayor of Témara pointed out that the pasha was such an important figure for the 
work of the municipality that it warranted his use of municipal resources. Interview by both authors, 
November 15, 2008, Témara.
44. It is interesting to note that Meknès, where the mayor was later dismissed by the governor on 
corruption charges, does not stand out negatively in its practices, either among PJD-governed towns 
or more generally. This supports the notion that this was a purely politically motivated dismissal in 
an effort to tarnish the PJD’s reputation. James N. Sater, “New Wine in Old Bottles: Political Parties
[Continued on next page]
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public tenders, an issue that CdCs highlight as one key recurrent problem. With the 
exception of construction permits, many practices appear to reflect the inability of the 
PJD to challenge established arrangements and thereby live up to its promise of con-
ducting itself differenly once involved in the practical details of government. Finally, 
it is worth noting that the town with the clean audit was one where the PJD had a high 
level of popular support and only one coalition partner, whereas the municipalities with 
recommendations had lower levels of support with the number of coalition partners 
ranging from three in Kasba Tadla to eight in Témara.
effort of PJd LocaL Governments: the evoLution of LocaL BudGets
An important way of assessing the effort and managerial effectiveness of local gov-
ernments is to study their investment and revenue patterns by analyzing municipal budgets. 
We obtained key items of municipal budgets from 2001 to 2007 in three PJD-governed 
towns, Ksar El Kébir, Oued Zem, and Témara. Because we have information on budgets 
before the PJD came into power, we are able to uncover the impact of PJD governance.
 Budgets are generally divided into current revenues and expenditures, and in-
vestment revenues and expenditures. Current revenues are the revenues earned on a 
regular basis (local taxes collected by the municipality, local taxes collected by the 
state, and part of the nationwide value-added tax, or VAT). Current expenditures are the 
type of expenditures that recur every year, such as salaries of civil servants, payment 
of debts, and other expenses. There are also investment expenditures. From the revenue 
side, the items used to finance investments are reserves (the accumulated wealth of the 
municipality), loans (borrowing), or government grants (a special VAT allocation as-
signed for investment). Investment expenditures include works such as roads or cultural 
centers; acquisition of goods such as new buildings, cars, or trucks for municipal use; 
and participation in national or integrated programs such as the well-known national 
program Villes sans Bidonvilles (Cities without Slums) to eradicate slums and relocate 
their inhabitants in standard housing.
The budget entries that best reflect managerial effort and competence are invest-
ment revenues and expenditures, as well as taxes collected by the municipality. Lo-
cal authorities in developing countries often have problems spending their budgets and 
making investments due to the lack of expertise and management resources needed to 
program and follow multiyear investments. In Morocco, there is indeed consensus that 
the collectivités locales tend to accumulate too much in reserves.45 A municipality with-
out too many reserves and with some borrowing used for investment can thus be a sign 
of an active local authority. Similarly, a municipality with a high level of tax collection 
reflects efforts to obtain resources to undertake these investments in a sustainable way.
[Continued from previous page]
under Mohammed VI,” in Contemporary Morocco: State, Politics and Society Under Mohammmed 
VI, eds. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine (New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 9–23.
45. See Nalini Burn, Larabi Jaidi, and Hayat Zirari, Budget Local Et Genre Au Maroc [Local 
Budget and Gender in Morocco] (Casablanca: Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc, 
2005) www.un.org.ma/IMG/pdf/unifem_18_fr.pdf. In a similar vein, a civil servant from the treasury 
that also held the office of deputy mayor of Rabat, argued that under-spending was one of the biggest 
problems of municipal management. Interview by the authors, November 2, 2007, Rabat.
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We first studied the evolution of investment expenditures and municipal taxes in 
PJD-led towns relative to the average of urban municipalities and all local authorities in 
Morocco (the latter including rural municipalities, provinces, and regions). The urban 
series offers a better comparison to PJD-governed towns, but the series including all 
local authorities is available for a longer period of time, including some years before 
and after the arrival of new local governments in 2003.46 In order to make meaningful 
comparisons, we have divided all budget items by the relevant population. Quantities 
have also been deflated using a price index with base in 2005. Thus, the numbers pro-
vided should be interpreted as dirhams per person per year in real terms.47
Graph I plots the evolution of investment expenditures and local tax extraction from 
2000 to 2007. The thin dotted lines correspond to the averages of urban and all local au-
thorities. First, we consider investment expenditure. For both averages, there has been an 
important increase in investment expenditure. The increase was relatively modest until 
2006 and accelerates substantially in 2007. The PJD-governed towns show different pat-
terns. Témara starts with higher than average investment per capita and remains virtually 
at the same level throughout the years. Ksar El Kébir and Oued Zem, in contrast, start 
with investment levels far below the average but show a marked upward trend.
The specific chronological pattern in Ksar El Kébir and Oued Zem is striking. In 
particular, it is clear that investment expenditures rise significantly after 2004, the first 
year of PJD rule. In Ksar al-Kébir, the change in trend is truly dramatic, from around 
20 MAD per inhabitant from 2000 to 2004, to around 250 in 2007, a more than tenfold 
increase. The increase is also very significant for Oued Zem, which started with even 
lower levels, close to zero, and was investing around 100 MAD per inhabitant by 2007. 
In contrast to the average, these increases were not particularly concentrated at the end 
of the period, but started at the beginning of the PJD-led legislature.
Municipal taxes, in contrast, show much less variation than investment expenditures. 
All series remain relatively flat, particularly the average of urban municipalities. PJD-gov-
erned towns show a slight upward trend, but there is no evidence of a rupture in the trend.
Thus, there is evidence of large increases in investment in Ksar El Kébir and 
Oued Zem, but these increases do not appear to have been financed by locally collected 
taxes. Offering insight into the origins of the resources for the increased investment 
expenditures, Graph II shows the evolution of reserves and borrowing for the three mu-
nicipalities. Here, again, we observe significant differences across the PJD-governed 
towns. The main insight from these figures is that whereas reserve depletion seems to 
have played a role in Oued Zem, borrowing seems to have been relevant in Ksar El 
Kébir. The left panel of the figure, depicting the evolution of reserves, clearly shows 
46. Data for urban municipalities come from the 2005, 2006, and 2007 activity reports of the King-
dom of Morocco, Directorate of Budget, “Rapport d’Activité de la Direction du Budget” [“Budget 
Directorate Activity Report”]. Data for the totality of local authorities (collectivités locales) come 
from a report by the finance ministry that contains a consistent series from 2002 to 2007. Kingdom 
of Morocco, Ministry of Economy and Finance, “Tableau de Bord des Finances Publiques” [“Dash-
board of Public Finances”], Dec. 2008, available on the website of the National Observatory of Hu-
man Development, www.albacharia.ma/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/31146/0901Tableau%20
de%20bord%20des%20finances%20publiques.pdf.
47. The population data comes from Kingdom of Morocco, “General Census of Population and 
Housing, 2004.” The price index data come from the World Bank’s world development indicators.
48 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
how reserves in Oued Zem were increasing steadily until 2004, at which point they 
leveled off and then started to fall. Reserves in Ksar El Kébir were also increasing and 
then grew to a halt in 2003, but they were low to start with, so there was not much room 
for depletion in order to finance investment; reserves were maintained during the PJD 
tenure of office and the town resorted to borrowing. The amount borrowed was actually 
very large, reaching around 200 MAD per inhabitant in 2006.
Graph I. Investment and Taxes in PJD-Governed Towns
Compared to the Moroccan Average
Sources: For municipality averages, see Footnote 45. For PJD-governed municipalities, data were col-
lected by the authors from financial managers of each respective municipality.
Graph II. Borrowing and Reserves in PJD-Governed Towns
Sources: Collected by the authors from financial managers of each respective municipality.
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In sum, the performance of the different PJD governments differs significantly. The 
most noticeable difference is between Ksar El Kébir and Oued Zem on the one hand, 
and Témara on the other. The PJD seems to have made a true difference only in the 
former group, where investment levels increased substantially. This could be partly due 
to the fact that Ksar El Kébir and Oued Zem started with very low levels of investment. 
However, it is also worth noting that these two towns are precisely those where the PJD 
obtained larger levels of support in 2003, thus having more room to follow its own policy.
It is not completely clear, however, if these trends reflect good management. Tax 
collections have barely increased. The increase in investment appears to have been fi-
nanced partly by diminishing reserves in Oued Zem and by borrowing in Ksar El Kébir, 
putting into question the sustainability of their model.
ELECTORAL OUTCOMES
Using the results of the 2009 municipal elections, we evaluated the electoral out-
comes of PJD-led local governments. These results are a good performance indicator, 
even if we are unable to tell which PJD government actions voters were actually evalu-
ating with their votes. To assess the potential role of local governance, we compared the 
2009 results to their 2003 counterparts.
Table V shows the share of seats obtained by the PJD in all municipalities in the 
2003 and 2009 local elections. Naturally, in 2003, the PJD obtained a much larger share 
of seats in the municipalities it ended up governing. Comparing the 2009 results with 
those of 2003, it becomes apparent that the PJD improved, on average, regardless of 
whether it governed or not. Moreover, the increase in seat shares is not dramatically 
different in places where it governed (from 23% to 30%) compared to where it did not 
govern (from 1% to 4%).
This pattern, however, masks an important distinction between places where 
the PJD governed with a strong mandate versus those where it did not. The third 
and fourth rows of the table distinguish PJD-governed municipalities according to 
whether they had obtained more (or less) than 30% of the seats in 2003. The pattern is 
striking: among PJD-governed municipalities, the party’s election performance sky-
rocketed in places where its 2003 results had been strong to begin with. In contrast, 
the PJD stagnated in places where it governed with a limited mandate. This suggests 
that governing made an important difference in the subsequent elections, but only in 
those municipalities with strong 2003 results.
Table V. PJD Results in Local Elections, 2003 and 2009
Local Areas
Average 
PJD seat 
share, 2003
Average 
PJD seat 
share, 2009
Without PJD-led government in 2003 or 2009 1% 4%
With PJD-led government in 2003 or 2009 23% 30%
Where PJD received less than 30% of seats 15% 11%
Where PJD received more than 30% of seats 37% 68%
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CONCLUSION
This article studied one cycle of local-level political activity by Morocco’s 
Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), from its election campaign in 2003 
to the outcomes of the subsequent 2009 elections. There is some evidence that the 
PJD’s performance — in both elections and in government — stood apart from Mo-
roccan norms. For the campaign, the PJD featured a much more prominent role of 
the national and local party organization as opposed to that of individual politicians. 
The pool of candidates that the PJD put to the forefront were also different, younger, 
more educated, and with more teachers and fewer “peasants” (“fellahin”) — suggest-
ing a lower presence of local notables.
Regarding actual governance, we find an interesting difference between gov-
erned places where the PJD obtained a substantial share of seats (30–49%) and those 
where it did not. In towns with high PJD support, the analysis of local budgets reveals 
a substantial increase in investment upon the arrival of the PJD. Regarding corruption, 
although it is unclear if all of these towns were audited, we find that none received 
“recommendations” from the Court of Auditors (CdC). In those towns, the party ex-
perienced dramatic electoral gains in the subsequent local election. In contrast, in 
towns where it governed with low support, we do not observe significant changes 
upon the arrival of the PJD-led government.
We argue that these different governance outcomes might be due to constraints 
imposed by coalition partners. As we have seen, in places where the PJD governed with 
less than 30% of seats, it did so within broad coalition (an average of more than five 
partners). The need to satisfy these large coalitions might have limited the performance 
of PJD mayors. This appears to be likely at least for corruption or mismanagement 
where the PJD did not appear to engage in new illicit practices, but rather was rather 
unable to change existing arrangements.
It is important to note that, even in towns where the PJD governed with sub-
stantial support, the extent of its efficiency and the policy orientation of its rule must 
be qualified. Policies and ideology did not appear to influence coalition-formation. 
While mayoral candidates emphasized their personal appeal in addition to the PJD’s. 
there was seldom reference to any political platform. Whereas there were indeed in-
creases in investment, their sustainability is unclear, as they were financed either by 
reserves or by borrowing instead from increases in local tax collection. The evidence 
from subsequent electoral results is stronger and clearer, but leaves open the possibil-
ity that these improvements were the result, not of the successful provision of public 
services, but of clientelistic practices.
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